INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is a multi-cultural society with over 250 ethnic groups as well as three major religious groups namely Christianity, Islam and Afri can Traditional Religion (ATR). With an estimated population of about 200 million people, "the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo account for almost half of Nigeria's population, and many smaller groups tend to cluster around these three, creating a tri-polar ethnic structure around which competition strategies intensify" (CRISE Working Paper 44, March 2007). The Human Rights Watch report also observes that, "the country is divided along religious lines, with the boundaries between Muslim and Christian often overlapping with some of the most important ethnic and cultural divides" (Human Rights Watch, 2006) .
The cultural diversity of the Nigerian state naturally creates a plat form for competitive struggles between and among the existing interest groups. For instance, since the return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999, the country has witnessed very violent and turbulent ethnic and religiously induced conflicts, some of which have seriously shaken its political, economic and social foundations to the extent that the country's 'hard earned' Fourth Republic has been on the brink of collapse. This ominous trajectory currently facing the Nigerian state has made Profes sor Isaac Olawale Albert argue that:
Since Nigeria transited from military dictatorship to multi-party democracy on 29 May, 1999. The country has been bedeviled by various forms of violent social conflicts. Thousands of people lost their lives, were maimed or displaced from their communities as a result of these problems. While some of the conflicts had their 105 roots in the past historical circumstances of the con cerned communities, some others were "manufactured" by the elites, seeking to stretch the liberty inherent in the new democratic process in Nigeria to a breaking, if not absurd point (Albert, 2001 ).
The reality of this situation is that the Nigerian elites often find it very convenient to employ ethnicity and religion as tools in order to manipu late Nigerians in their power play game, owing to the hypnotic and ma nipulative power of ethnicity and religion on Nigerians. As Momodu rightly observes:
Religious and ethnic manipulations hold sway between and among ethnic groups with large number of illiterate populations and high incidence of poverty. This situation makes it possible for ethnic or religious entrepreneurs to assume the role of 'messiahs ' or 'fr eedom fi ghters ' for their ethnic or religious groups. In actual fact, the goals and interests that they seek to achieve are disguised as those of their ethnic or religious groups, which they claim to represent. Whenever these goals and interests appear to be threatened, they fan the embers of ethnic or religious hatred and conflict between their own ethnic or religious groups against the ethnic or religious group they perceive to be threatening their goals, using them as 'ethnic or religious sacrificial lambs ' for the sole pur pose of achieving their own selfish ends (Momodu, .
Ethnicity and religion play a very important role both in the private and public lives of Nigerians and this is affirmed by an authoritative survey carried out in 2000 on Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria, which notes that ethnicity "is demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria" (Lewis and Bratton 2000) . Thus, the survey found out that almost one-half (48.2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves with an ethnic (including linguistic and local-regional) identity, com pared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 21.0 percent who chose a religious identity (Lewis and Bratton 2000) . The study specifically indicated that "Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the workplace" (Lewis and Bratton 2000) .
The findings of the above scholars point to the fact that most Nigeri ans, about two-thirds of the country's population, show more loyalty to their ethnic and religious constituencies. This places both ethnicity and religion in a serious competition for the soul of the Nigerian state, just as God and the devil are competing for the soul of humanity. This danger ous competition has often bred violent ethno-religious conflicts in the country. Salawu (2010) observed that "about 40% of ethno-religious conflicts are credited to the fourth Republic of Nigeria, while observers have equally described the situation as a permanent feature of the Nigeria state," ethno-religious cohflicts tend to always stretch the bounds of unity to a potential snapping point (Jega, 2002) .
Inter-group relations in Nigeria are largely determined by ethnic, religious, economic and cultural factors thus creating fault-lines in most Nigerian communities. In particular, inter-group relations between and among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria are characterized fre quently by mutual suspicion and hatred to the extent that at the slightest provocation conflict is inevitable between communities; in most cases assuming very violent dimensions. This is the reason for instance why Okwueze (1995) rightly observed that, "Nigeria is one of the countries where religion and ethnic conflicts have wrecked much havoc on the advancement, unity and prosperity of her citizens and the development of the nation as a whole."
Nigeria is also one of the African countries most severely affected by violence. It is ranked 148 out of 162 countries worldwide in the Global Peace Index (Vision for Humanity, Global Peace Index, 20 13). It has the third largest number of political violence events in Armed Con flict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED), and it is ranked 16th in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index 2013 (Fund for Peace, 20 13). A 2012 survey of Nigerians on crime and victimization by the CLEEN Founda tion found that, on average, 5% of respondents had personally been vic tims of armed violence (CLEEN Foundation, 20 12).
There are many ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in Ni geria. For instance, Mohammed (2005) contends that before the present democratic dispensation in Nigeria, there were ethno-religious conflicts that claimed so many lives and property. Some examples of such crises include: the Maitatsine religious disturbances that ravaged parts of Kano, Bauchi, and Maiduguri in the early 1980s, which also spilled over to Jimeta-Yola 1984 Adeniyi (1993) , refers to a body of truths, laws and rites by which man is subordinated to the transcendent being. This implies that religion deals with norms and rules that emanated from God and which must be followed by the believers. Ej izu (1993) provides another definition of religion. According to him, religion is man's intui tion of the sacred and ultimate reality and his expression of that aware ness in concrete life. In essence, religion can be defined as the belief system held by a group of people towards a supreme being which they revere and believe can guarantee their security and welfare and their ex istence here on earth and in the hereafter.
ETHNIC GROUP
The term "ethnic" is derived from a Greek adjective ethnikos, mean ing "national, foreign, gentile." The adjective is derived from the noun ethnos, "people, nation, foreign people," that in the plural phrase ta ethn meaning "foreign nations" (The American Heritage Dictionary of the En glish Language, Fourth Edition, 2000). However, the task of defining ethnic group is somewhat difficult. Hence, many scholars believe that definitions of what constitutes an ethnic group or an ethnic minority are subject to much discussion (see Coleman and Salt, 1996; Bulmer, 1996; Ballard, 1996; Solomos and Black, 1996) .
The variations in the definitions of ethnic group and the lack of agreement among scholars on what should constitute the meaning of an ethnic group is responsible for the multiplicity of definitions on the con cept by various scholars in ethnic studies, ethnic conflict, sociology, po litical science and related disciplines. However, the common denominators in the many descriptions that have been given to ethnic group are : people residing within the same geographical territory, people who share the same historical memories, common origins, common iden tity, language, culture, and aspirations. What really is an ethnic group? Modood; Berthoud; Lakey; Nazroo; Smith; Virdee and Beishon (1997) define an ethnic group as a community whose heritage offers important characteristics in common between its members and which makes them distinct from other communities. There is a boundary, which separates 'us' from 'them', and the distinction would probably be recognized on both sides of that boundary. Quaker-Dokubo (2001) also perceives ethnic group as pertaining to organized activities by persons linked by a con sciousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to maximize their cor porate political, economic and social interest. Willigenburg (1995) refers to ethnic group as "cultural nations which are bound together in the first place by a common culture and which lack the internationally recognised organization of a sovereign state".
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
Ethno-religious conflict refers to a situation in which members of an ethnic group practicing the same religion engage in mutually opposing coercive interactions with members of another ethnic group practicing the same but different religion from the former group. Ethno-religious conflict is often characterised by a mixture of both ethnic and religious agitations. It is also a situation in which at least the interests or goals of members of an ethnic group who belong to the same religious group are in opposition to the interests or goals of another ethnic group practicing the same religion but different from the former group is exclusively de fined in ethnic and religious terms. Ethnicity and religion are tools for identity construction by the elites who draw on the mesmerizing and ma nipulative tendencies of both ethnicity and religion in competitive situa tions. The combination of ethnicity and religion for identity construction produces a strong platform for identity mobilization.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE THEORY
The study also adopted the theory of Territorial Imperative devel oped by Robert Ardrey in 1967, in which he traced the animal origin of property, nations and territoriality. A territory is defined as an area of space which an animal or group of animals defend as an exclusive pre serve. It is within such territory that the basic needs and interests of such animals are gratified. These needs include: security of space and food, identity, prestige, etc. They therefore defend such an area at all costs and strive to keep it out those who undermine their interests and needs. Fol lowing the above postulation, all animals, including man, have the natu ral tendency or instinct to be territorial and possessive, especially when their territories and possessions are threatened. In order to ward-off this threat, they will employ any means available to them to defend their territories and possessions. This is the reason why Ardrey (1967) opined that "if we defend the title to our land or the sovereignty of our country, we do it for reasons no different, no less innate, no less ineradicable, than do lower animals."
In the same manner, Sherif and Sherif (1969) support this view by arguing that territorial aggression in animals is based on the relatively simple chemical, tactile and visual discriminations involved in detecting unfamiliar 'opponents' while for humans the concept of 'territory' de pends on complex cultural symbolizations of property or 'homeland'. People, they pointed out, are quite capable of territorial loyalty without actually living in the territory itself. Therefore, conflict may ensue in an attempt by individuals, groups, or countries to defend their territories, land, traditions, culture, and property they so value. For instance, Tor Tiv, the paramount ruler of the Tiv people observes that "in many tradi tions, land matters are closely tied to the custom of the people; hence it could be very volatile" (Torkula, 2002) . This, in part, explains the reasons why ethnic groups fight over land and territory. Indeed, scholars have argued that territorially concentrated groups in divided societies are more likely to demand self-determination (Saideman and Ayres, 2000 and Toft 2003 ; Toft and Saideman 2010) and to be engaged in violent conflict in its pursuit (Fearon and Laitin 1999; Weidmann, Rod, Cederman 20 10) . This also explains the situation of the protracted ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari between the Jukun Chris tians allied with the Jukun traditionalists versus the Jukun Muslims sup ported by Hausa Muslims. The latter feels threatened by the resolve of the former to chase them out of their ancestral land and also deprive them of participating in both the political affairs of Wukari Local Gov ernment and in the Traditional Council of Wukari. As a result, the two groups have been engulfed in a fierce battle for the contest over who owns Wukari land and who is qua l ified to enjoy the rights and benefits of being indigenes of Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. The conflict between the two groups in Wukari, Taraba State is a classic ex ample of a struggle over territory and ethnic dominance.
ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF VIOLENT ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN
WUKART LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF TARABA STATE, NIGERIA
Inter-group relations among communities in Nigeria is rooted in the colonial history of the Nigerian state. However, inter-group relations in Nigeria predate the pre-colonial era and as a matter of fact, inter-group relations among Nigeria's pre-colonial societies could be said to be both harmonious and conflictive and span diverse areas such as: cultural ex changes, commerce, politics, and social spheres. But one fascinating as pect of inter-group relations in the Nigerian pre-colonial societies was that ethnic migrants were in many places integrated and assimilated into their host communities, even inter-marrying. Buttressing this argument, Olaniyi (200 1) cites the case of Yoruba Ayagi quarters in Kano who after a century of settlement had been assimilated into Hausa culture. Usman (1981) describes a similar assimilation process in respect to diverse groups that migrated into Katsina and became "absorbed into the house holds patronages through marriages and cohabitation."
The colonial political economy further increased the migration of Hausa people into Y oruba land. This was due to the emergence of the colonial capitalist economy which introduced taxes and opened up roads and railways linking all the major cities of Nigeria. Hopkins (1973) be lieves that such factors encouraged and facilitated the increase in migra tion of Nigerians generally. Furthermore, Swindell (1984) observes that "as the twentieth century developed, labour migration clearly took on new dimension and, from what can be inferred, there was a rapid in crease in the volume of migration to meet new levels of taxation and demands for labour in the towns and commercial crop zones." Conse quently, this trend has heightened competition for the available scarce resources between hosts and settlers across major towns in Nigeria until today. This is also the case with Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, which is an amalgam of different ethnic and religious populations and has consequently witnessed many violent ethnic and re ligiously induced conflicts.
Recently, Wukari has been experiencing a protracted ethno-relig ious conflict and the main cause of the conflict has been the struggle for the control of Wukari land and, by extension, competition for the eco nomic and political resources in the area between the Jukun Christians allied with the Jukun traditionalists and the Jukun Muslims supported by Hausa Muslims in the area. Both parties hold tenaciously to their dispa rate narratives which they often express. On one hand, the Jukun Chris tians in alliance with the Jukun traditionalists accuse the Jukun Muslims supported by Hausa Muslims of wanting to deliberately and systemati cally violate the Jukun traditional culture by planning to politically con-trol Wukari. The Jukun Christians, who consider themselves not only the owners of Wukari land but also the custodians of the Jukun traditional culture, are prepared to spill their last blood to defend it from the en croachment of the Muslim Jukun supported by the Rausa Muslim settlers on Wukari land.
On the other hand, the Jukun Muslims supported by Rausa Muslims accuse the Jukun Christians and the Jukun traditionalists of excluding them from the political control of Wukari Local Government Area as well as from the traditional Council. These are the real issues in the con flict and these issues have encouraged the politicization of both ethnic and religious identities in Wukari area. This is so because scholars have argued that ethnic and religious conflicts are rooted in the politicization of ethnic and religious identities and the competition and conflict for political power by the ethnic and religious communities respectively (Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1999) . More specifically, Takaya (1992: 112) identified centrifugal factors that gave rise to the politicization of ethnic and religious identities in Nigeria, which include:
(i) the existence of two or more ethnic and religious groups with nu merical strengths that can significantly affect the outcome and di rection of a democratic political process;
(ii) the instrumentalization of ethnicity and religion as a legitimizing tool of hegemony in instances when the interests of the political class are under threat;
(iii) when there is an ascendant radical thinking within a politically sig nificant ethnic or religious group capable of upstaging hegemony;
(iv) when the society is characterized by political, social or economic hardships that can cause alliances along ethnic and religious fault lines.
The persistent conflicts between Jukun Christians/Jukun traditionalists versus the Jukun Muslims supported by Rausa Muslims have led to loss of many lives and the destruction of much property and have distorted inter-group relations in the Wukari community. The mixture of ethnicity and religion have taken the situation between the warring groups to unimaginable and deadly heights such that brothers and sisters who have the same ancestral linkage and have co-existed in harmony for centuries have suddenly turned on one another with murderous fervor, a situation re-enforced by bitter and dangerous politics. The vulnerability of the Wukari community to violent conflicts can be attributed mainly to factors such as: the contest for indigeneship of Wukari LGA; competition for political, social and economic space; the problem of youth unemployment; and arms proliferation in the area. It is in the light of these factors that Mitchell (2000) asserts that conflicts involving settlers and natives usually revolve around the question of land, and in most cases around the quest by settlers to dispossess the natives of their land through what he called migratory overcrowding. Mitchell's assertion can be said to be true about the Wukari community which is an area that is agriculturally rich and has often resulted in vio lent competition for resources between the Jukun, who consider them selves as the natives of Wukari, against the other ethnic groups such as Tiv, Fulanis and Hausa communities in Wukari.
The Jukun Christians/Jukun traditionalists believe that the Hausal Fulani settlers are collaborating with the Jukun Muslims and that their hidden agenda is to Islamize and take over Jukun land. This suspicion of the Jukun Christians and Jukun traditionalists is also the same one that is held by most host communities where the HausaIFulani groups are set tled. This accounts for why the HausalFulani settlers are much resented, which along with their domineering tendencies, makes the host commu nities discriminate against them. Best (2006) has rightly observed that "the struggle of ethnic minorities, framed by their experience of domina tion, tends to be targeted primarily against the HausaIFulani, and indi rectly against the Nigerian State". The mobilization of religious and ethnic sentiments and solidarity towards gaining control over Wukari land has been fueling violent conflicts between the Jukun Christians in alliance with the Jukun traditionalists against the Jukun Muslims also in alliance with the Hausa settlers in Wukari.
Another major cause of the violent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari is the availability of small and big arms in the area. For instance, Wukari has witnessed so many violent conflicts such as the protracted violent conflicts between the Jukun and Tiv which, according to Momodu (2014) , is:
One of the most violent and recurring ethnic conflicts that have occurred in Nigeria and the periodic clashes between the two groups span from the 1860s to 1899, 1904, 1950s, 1964, 1976, 1987; and from 1990-1993 and 2001-2002 , it climaxed into violent warfare. The human, economic, political, social and psychological costs asso ciated with these perennial conflicts are colossal and some of these costs are still very visible in Wukari (Momodu, 2014) .
Wukari has also witnessed pockets of skirmishes between the Tiv and Fulani, Jukun and Fulani as well the current persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the area. These several crises have deeply entrenched the culture of violence in inter-group relations in the area. Momodu (2014) established that, "the free usage of arms especially by the Tiv and Jukun militias to kill and maim indicates the magnitude of proliferation of arms in Wukari and its environs and it also suggests the vulnerability of Wukari to violent conflicts." This situation therefore underscores the "privatisation of violence that challenges the monopoly of violence as a defining feature of the state" (Debiel, 2002) . The proliferation of arms in Wukari has made the area unstable and unsecured.
Clearly, the Wukari community is Balkanized along ethnic and re ligious fault lines thus resulting in a situation where the Jukun Christians lack confidence or trust in their fellow Jukun Muslims or HausalFulani settlers in Wukari community. As a result, there currently exists a psy chological and physical fault line between the Jukun Christians and Jukun Traditionalists on one hand and on the other hand the Jukun Mus lims and HausalFulani. This situation has often given the impetus for violent conflicts. This tendency if not checked will continue to create instability in the area, which is the way in which it is currently playing out.
IMPACT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE
The following A cursory look at the above time line of the violent ethno-religious con flicts in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State reveals that the conflict is primarily rooted in the struggle for political and economic control of Wukari, which assumed ethnic and religious dimensions. The persistent nature of the conflict also indicates that it has become pro tracted, particularly from April 2014 to date. Generally, the impact of the violent ethno-religious conflicts on inter-group relations in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State can be categorized as follows:
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT
Violent ethno-religious conflict in Wukari community has claimed so many lives of the residents of the area, especially Christians and Mus lims, Jukun and Hausa! Fulani. For instance, Th e People 's Daily of Mon day June 16, 2014, reported that about thirty-two people were killed in Wukari. The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the area also led to the displacement of many residents of Wukari. The Guardian Newspaper of Monday, August 18, 2014 indicated that there were many displaced per sons from the incidences of ethno-religious conflicts while Th e Premium Newspaper also observed that over seven hundred (700) people were dis placed from Wukari.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the Wukari Local Gov ernment Area of Taraba State have also negatively impacted the econ omy of the area. The Tiv farmers whose farming resourcefulness is the mainstay of the economy of Wukari as well as the Igbo traders are now both moving out in large numbers from the area for fear of their lives. This situation has greatly affected commerce and the economy of area.
SOCIAL IMPACT
Social interactions have been dislocated by the persistent ethno-re ligious conflicts in the Wukari town and its environs. There is social and psychological separation between the Jukun Christians and the Jukun/ Hausa Muslims, deepened by mutual hatred and suspicion. The violence has also created a divided settlement pattern separating 'Jukun Christian/ jukun traditionalist settlement' and 'JukunlHausa Muslim settlement.' By this settlement pattern, neither side could risk crossing to the other side without being killed. 
S UGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE
Ethno-religious conflict is a common feature of most multi-cultural and divided societies, as Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) assert in their famous work, Politics in Plural Societies: A Th eory of Democratic Insta bility. According to Rabushka and Shepsle, "divided states remain peren nially unstable and many survive on the brink of collapse and disintegration." Divided states also lack the capacity to manage the di verse groups interests, as Jinadu (2007) rightly observes about the nature and character of the state:
... the state and its institutions are ethnicised and im mersed in clientelist ethnic and religious networks and in ethnic/religious based struggle to implant and entrench ethnic or religious 'gatekeepers' in critical, key positions in the bureaucracy and educational institutions, and in other public sector institutions and even in the private sector, which in many African countries relies heavily on the public sector (Jinadu, 2007) .
Notwithstanding the above position, a very fundamental truth that must be stressed at this juncture is the fact that most conflicts in divided societies have become protracted and irresolvable primarily because peo ple still largely believe that it is only the state that has the capacity, or the magic-wand, to resolve conflicts when it is in fact the state that is gener ating social conflicts within its domain through its actions and inactions. Rummel (1994) argues that the "government of any state is the greatest potential threat to any group inside its boundaries." It is imperative there fore that citizens and communities should understand that they are the ones who need to manage their problems, hence they must establish mechanisms and strategies that will effectively address the problems confronting them. No community or society can exist in isolation of other communities because communities exist interdependently. In this regard, Touval (1985) has rightly observed that the "pluralistic character of most African states has led to the development of mechanisms of ad justment enabling the accommodation of the interests and needs of di verse ethnic groups. Most have developed norms and procedures enabling the maintenance of an ethnic (religious) balance within the po litical and administrative institutions."
The following suggestions are proffered towards permanently ad dressing the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari Local Govern ment Area of Taraba State:
a). Establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee
Peace, as a valuable gem cannot be decreed unto any society be cause it requires the collective resolve of all stakeholders in order to plant the seed of peace, nurture it, and harvest its fruits. Peace, therefore, requires true reconciliation among all the stakeholders in any society in order for it to be instituted and sustained. The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari community have negatively affected the political, ec onomic, social and cultural landscapes of Wukari, with debilitating nega tive implications on inter-group relations in the area. All of the stakeholders in Wukari, especially the Jukun Christians and Jukun Tradi tionalists, Jukun Muslims and the Hausa Muslims, should immediately agree to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee that will be sad dled with the responsibility of reconciling the parties involved in the conflict.
Michael Ignatieff (1996) , remarks, "as the African proverb reminds us, 'truth is not always good to say', but when it is shared, it is capable of healing the wounds." Therefore, the establishment of a Truth and Recon ciliation Committee (TRC) is important because it will create the plat form that will assist the warring parties in Wukari to make sense of the complex issues involved in the conflict as well as reconcile them. As Lerche (2000) argues, all sides have their own version of the truth of "what really happened." The parties will be able to reconcile the issues that had hitherto been irreconcilable. Some of these issues are what Har old Saunders identifies as: "fear, suspicion, rejection, mistrust, (exclusion and marginalization), hatred and misperception which are often greater obstacles to peace than an inability to resolve technically definable problems".
b). Power Sharing Arrangement
It is a fact that most and if not all ethno-religious conflicts are inex tricably linked to the competition for political and economic resources and the tool that is often used in such competition is identity politics which is usually done by invoking the dare-devil politics of indigene versus settler dichotomy. In this contest, an indigene is perceived to be somebody who is historically affiliated to the place or town or commu nity or locality being contested for and by the virtue of hislher affiliation to the place, he/she enjoys some certain rights and benefits that those who are considered as settlers in the area cannot enjoy.
On the other hand, a settler is perceived as a person who does not have historical affiliation to a place or town or community or locality, due to this, he or she is excluded from enjoying certain rights and bene fits that those who considers themselves indigenous to the place enjoy. This kind of perception and definition is a total violation of the concept of citizenship which is supposed to guarantee every bona fide citizen the legal right to enjoy the basic rights and benefits available in any part of a sovereign state. This is the reason why Ibrahim (2000:69) argues that ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are linked to citizenship within the context of identity, which is rooted in the politics of inclusion or exclu sion. These are tied to claims and counter-claims over identity as a basis for determining who is excluded or included from decision making as well as access to opportunities under the 'we' versus 'them' cliche (Kwaja, 2008:83) . At the core of ethnic agitations and conflicts are "dis tributive questions, which are the fundamental sources of ethnic tensions in Nigeria" (Nnoli 1978 and 1994) .
As pointed out by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts (1997: 100):
In many multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, the procedures of majoritarian democracy have proven ef fective for managing group relations and maintaining so cial cohesion. However, in societies with deep ethnic and religious divisions and little experience with demo cratic government and the rule of law, strict majoritarian democracy can be self-defeating. Where ethnic and re ligious identities are strong and national identity weak, the population may vote largely along ethnic or religious lines. Domination by one ethnic or religious group(s) can lead to a tyranny of the majority [emphasis added] (100).
Indeed, it is always very important for communities and societies experiencing conflict to avoid both the tyranny of the majority and the revengeful terrorism of the minority, and to understand that they have to work together to resolve their differences so as to build a just and fair community or society in which the rights and interests of all can be guar anteed. This example can also be applied to the Wukari case. Both the Jukun Christians and the Jukun Traditionalists who are the majority in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State and the minority Jukun Muslims who are always in alliance with the Hausa Muslims in the area must come to the understanding that they need to work out an inclusive political arrangement that would give both sides, and even the other groups resident in the area, the sense of belonging in the political archi tecture of Wukari. This is especially because some researchers on con flict management have pointed out that the openness of political institutions decreases the chances of occurrences of violent conflict and protests (e.g., Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyven-dak and Giugni, 1995) . This is important because inclusive political arrangements reduce the tendency of competing groups resorting to violent agitations. The adoption of this practice will therefore assist in the accommodation of diversity, which will allay the fears of both the ethnic and religious minorities in the area as well as guarantee the protection of the rights of all the residents of Wukari. In addition, it will assist in the transformation of the perception of ethnic and religious loyalties from being a threat to the social cohesion of Wukari to being utilized as an engine of socio-economic development.
CONCLUSION
Religion and ethnicity are two very important tools that the elites in Nigeria employ in constructing and mobilizing identity in competitive situations. Identity politics have resulted in violent and uncontrollable conflicts of different intensity and magnitudes. The major task of this paper has been to examine the dynamics of the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari area of Taraba State, Nigeria and the possibility for its sustainable management. The paper therefore proposed some very ro bust strategies for tackling the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari community with a view to making all the residents of Wukari, regardless of their ethnic or religious divide, work out some kind of mo dus vivendi that would enable them to accommodate each other and peacefully coexist. This is with the understanding that no community can exist in isolation of other communities hence communities exist interdependently.
